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Abstract 
Energy poverty is well acknowledged in the global public and scholarly 
discussions. Nonetheless, it is habitually analysed in isolation from the discourse 
through which it is framed, produced, represented and known. Using Zimbabwe 
as a case study, inductive qualitative research reveals that there is one main 
discourse associated with energy poverty: net deficit (supply-demand mismatch). 
This discourse is expressed by narratives that have competed for dominance in 
the Zimbabwean energy sector (2012-present), in particular, the effect of changes 
in the climate, vandalism of electricity infrastructure, the impact of sanctions, and 
the low rate of renewable energy adoption, are analysed. Findings reveal that 
these narratives construct and interpret energy poverty as an outcome of external 
factors, while alternative views are scarcely considered due to asymmetrical 
power relations. The paper concludes that energy poverty cannot be understood 
outside of the political-economic discourse that constructs and interprets it. 
Hence, a discursive approach to energy poverty is apt for informing a well-
balanced energy policy and practice. 





Various narratives compete for dominance in conceptualising and explaining 
energy poverty in Zimbabwe, which is predominantly understood in net deficit 
terms [1]. Consequently, economic and technological solutions are regarded as 
the panacea. This article argues that a tendency to idealise the technological-
economic narrative, especially given the allure of energy efficiency in the form 
of science and technology elides other narratives that could challenge the status 
quo. 
Drawing upon Zimbabwe’s existing literature, which is largely macroeconomics 
oriented, Mbohwa observes that promoting power investment in bagasse energy 
cogeneration could offer a bridging and reliable alternative for electricity 
generation in Zimbabwe [2]. Furthermore, there are economic factors that need 
to be followed: ‘set cost-effective purchase prices, ensure independence of tariff 
setting, encourage process improvements, encourage power investments through 
incentives, ensure top level government commitment…’ [2: p.1]. Similarly, 
Kaseke contends that there is an economic need to increase electricity supply 
capacity and allocation [3]. Likewise, Dube analyses the significance of 
affordability, with particular focus on the impact of energy subsidies on energy 
consumption and supply in Zimbabwe [4].  
In the same line of reasoning, neo-Marxist scholars are likely to commit the same 
error. Söderholm explored the political economy of power generation in 
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Zimbabwe [5]. Following a political-economic approach, he examined the 
historical conflict between economic and political goals in Zimbabwe’s 
electricity supply. Recently, Chipango analysed energy poverty in Zimbabwe by 
drawing on concepts such as class inequality and placed emphasis on social 
scarcity of the resource [6]. Indeed, political economic questions have never lost 
their salience in historical materialist approaches [7], but in the context of energy 
poverty, this approach is inadequate. This is because the Marxist focus lies in 
denouncing class domination, but the mechanics of power in themselves are never 
analysed [8]. The Marxist view perceives the forces behind energy poverty as 
repressive and the energy poor as denied modern energy access by the powerful 
[9]. This perspective is unreasonably narrow because it depicts power as a force 
of prohibition only. Resultantly, the discourse part is left ‘constricted, conflated 
and hopelessly underdeveloped’ [10: p.481]. 
That said, there is scant literature in the Zimbabwean context which analyses 
energy poverty through a discourse lens. One could speculate that a lack of 
literature, explains the dominance of one discourse of net deficit (supply-demand 
mismatch). Sadly, looking at the physical phenomenon, without interrogating the 
discourse that constructs it, can lead to myopic analysis. Among the exceptions 
is Banjwa who conducted a critical analysis of the alternative discourse with a 
case of Kasese District in Uganda [11]. The study sought to establish the extent 
to which alternative energy technological solutions can contribute to the 
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alleviation of poverty according to particular discourses. It emerged that 
alternative energy poverty discourse, in many ways, has an ideological 
relationship with the mainstream development agenda, in which the logics of the 
latter are reinforced by the former [11]. Likewise, Rafey and Sovacool examined 
competing discourses of energy development and the implications of the Medupi 
coal-fired power plant in South Africa [12]. They observe that energy poverty is 
a subjective phenomenon constantly negotiated through discourses.  
Taking a postmodern perspective, this article departs from essentialism, which 
reduces everything to a few essential causes: economic and technological factors. 
It contends that there is a compelling need to ‘question the underlying world 
views upon which each of these narratives, and the policies that flow from them, 
depend’ [13:p.xvii]. Only in the resulting light, can we truly discern how energy 
poverty is discursively constructed at a large number of sites by various 
discourses. Against this backdrop, the contribution of this article lies in 
illuminating what policy options are enabled, constrained or made invisible by 
the deployed discourses. This dialectical approach gives us the foresight to assess 
policies and to reimagine structural changes in the political framework [14]. To 
address energy poverty, we must have the capacity to counter the power of the 
net deficit discourse that circulates throughout society. This should not be 
misconstrued as denial of the empirical deficit of energy resources, electricity in 
particular, but to question how this net deficit discourse is (mis)used to justify the 
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status quo-who puts it out there and why and how that net deficit came into being 
in the first place. 
With this focus, this article is committed to teasing out how the dominant 
discourse of net deficit (supply-demand mismatch) constructs and shapes the 
energy poverty phenomenon in Zimbabwe. It places particular focus on the 
dominant narratives which include the effect of changes in the climate, vandalism 
of electricity infrastructure, the impact of sanctions and a low level of renewable 
energy adoption. While these narratives appear common sense, they are 
superseded by Gramsci’s notion of good sense. For Gramsci, good sense, calls 
for a critical awareness of the underlying structural basis for existing conditions 
[15]. For that reason, it is irrelevant to ask whether these concepts and beliefs are 
‘true’ or ‘false’ [16: p.15]. Rather, we have to ask what produces them and what 
is it that they serve to produce.  
The study presents strong evidence that due to the deployment of the net deficit 
discourse (supply-demand mismatch); energy poverty is constructed and 
interpreted as a natural outcome of external factors. Hence, the status quo 
continues unchallenged absolving the government of wrongdoing. From the 
analysis, it emerged that discourse is not static and that there is no narrative, 
without counter narrative. This is evinced by adversarial and contentious 
empirical evidence that energy poverty is an internal man-made phenomenon-I 
call this the other discourse. 
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The structure of the article is as follows: the next section provides the context of 
the study. Section 3 teases out the concept of discourse as the analytic gaze for 
this study. Section 4 presents the methodology employed. Section 5 presents 
findings and their discussion. The paper concludes in Section 6, where it suggests 
policy implications and areas for further research. 
2.  Context 
Defining energy poverty is a somewhat arduous task. While in the North, the 
focus is on thermal comfort, in the South it is a phenomenon that is connected to 
socio-economic development, well-being and the quality of life [17]. For this 
reason, I adopt a definition put forward by the Asian Development Bank that 
energy poverty is ‘the absence of sufficient choice in accessing adequate, 
affordable, reliable, high quality, safe and environmentally benign energy 
services to support economic and human development’[18:p.47].  
Understanding energy poverty in this light clearly illustrates the Zimbabwean 
case. The  Ministry of Energy and Power Development (MEPD) states that 37% 
of households in Zimbabwe have access to electricity that is connected via power 
lines and in urban areas; 83% of households have electricity, compared with 13% 
in rural areas [1:p.1-2]. Rural communities meet 94% of their cooking energy 
requirements from traditional fuels, mainly fuelwood, and 20% of urban 
households use wood as the main cooking fuel [1:p.2]. The MEPD  observes that 
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a majority of urban households use electricity for cooking (73%); in contrast, only 
6% of rural households use electricity for this purpose [1: p.2].   
The country has an installed capacity of about 2 300 Megawatts (MW), with 
Zimbabwe Power Company (a subsidiary of Zimbabwe Electricity Supply 
Authority-ZESA) owning around 95% [19:p.07]. The MEPD states that the actual 
power generation capacity is about 1 400MW against a peak demand of 1 
700MW and to make up for the shortfall, Zimbabwe imports 50MW firm power 
from Hydro Cahorra Bassa of Mozambique and around 300MW non-firm power 
from ESKOM, South Africa [19:p.13]. In addition, the MEPD observes that: 
‘historically, supply has been failing to meet demand which has led to significant 
power deficits and frequent load shedding.’[19:p.13]. Net deficit discourse is 
stemming from the national policy.  
3. The discourse of energy poverty 
Ever since Foucault shook social science and medicine by suggesting that sex 
does not exist as a universally given entity [20], but is an artificial construction 
elaborated through the employment of sexuality as a historical discourse, this 
latter concept has become increasingly prominent in a wide range of research 
[21]. Discourse is here defined ‘as an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories 
through which meaning is given to phenomena’ [22:p.46]. In this context, it 
means that discourse frames energy poverty in a certain way–distinguishing some 
aspects of it rather than others; advocating certain policies and not others.  
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There are three rationales for this analysis. First, we need a political philosophy 
that unpacks how ‘social and political framings’ are entrenched in the formulation 
of scientific explanation of energy poverty. It is in language that programmes of 
government are elaborated and language serves as a mechanism that establishes 
a kind of identity or interests between political rationalities and regulatory 
aspirations [23]. For instance, Rennkamp et al. teased out the competing 
coalitions and the politics of renewable energy and fossil fuels in Mexico, South 
Africa and Thailand [24]. They argue that the emergence of renewable energy 
policy results from the structure of discourse coalitions assembled in favour of 
and against renewable energy policies.  
Second, such an approach is important in examining knowledge of energy 
poverty-why and how particular forms of knowledge predominate. By 
implication, the production and circulation of a certain discourse is central to the 
implementation of power. For Foucault, ‘these relations of power cannot 
themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, 
accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse’ [8: p.93, my emphasis]. 
Taking a gender perspective, Listo illustrates that gender myths are political and 
discourse instrumentalises women and gender for particular energy interventions, 
doing so at the expense of gender equality outcomes [25].  
Third and finally, discourses are shaped interests. What different groups of 
categories of actors believe and do about a policy question is a reflection of their 
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interests [26]. Due to competing interests, actors may put forward different 
narratives to meet their intended objectives. In this regard, Mander [27] and 
Szarka [28] are illustrative of the emergence of competitive, and sometimes 
cooperative coalitions in the area of renewable energy. In view of these 
rationalities, we urgently need a ‘linguistic turn’ [10: p.480, emphasis in original]. 
This means taking up a discursive analysis of energy poverty. 
Although the use of a discourse lens to analyse energy is growing, this analytical 
framework is missing from Zimbabwean scholarship. Most studies have focused 
on the macro economics of energy poverty. For instance, Mangwengwende [29] 
and Kayo [30] examine power sector reforms in Zimbabwe to determine how 
they will affect the expansion of electrification. The former assesses the 
implications of the tariff question for power sector reform. The latter focuses on 
how financial and operational performance have deteriorated at the power utility 
due to a lack of investments. Davidson and Mwakasonda examine the impact of 
power sector reforms on the poor, with a specific reference to electrification 
programmes [31]. They emphasise that the situation in Zimbabwe involves 
exchange rate against the United States dollar because of major changes to the 
Zimbabwean economy.  
Building upon this existing literature, an economic perspective emerges, which 
advances the notion of ‘causality’ [32: p.718). It is characterised by a determinism 
analysis: the case of energy poverty being reduced to an economic problem.   
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Parallel to the economic view is the technological perspective. This school of 
thought attributes energy poverty to a lack of modern technologies. Recently, 
Chahuruva and Dei observed that solar power could go a long way in countering 
the shortage of electricity in Zimbabwe [33]. Similarly, Mbohwa and Fukuda 
place emphasis on how the sugar industry can contribute bagasse-generated 
electricity to the grid [34].  
 This analysis reveals that a gap exists because we are confined to the world of 
material reality. However, what we need is a ‘moment’ of discourse in energy 
poverty studies. This ‘moment’ can be understood as resorting to the vast coded 
ways available to us for talking about, writing about and representing the world 
(35:p.78). Elsewhere, studies have focused on energy poverty through a discourse 
lens. These include Sanz-Hernández [36], Gamson and Modigliani [37] who 
teased out the relationship between media discourse and the public opinion on 
energy poverty and injustice.   
Nonetheless, it appears that analysing media representations gives analysis that 
is already framed by ‘selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration of the 
journalist involved’ [38:p.100-101]. Another shortfall that bedevils media 
framing of energy poverty is that such studies rarely look at how discourses 
become institutionalised within particular stakeholders or groups of actors; they 
usually study newspapers or television coverage, but not deeper policy briefs and 
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reports [12]. By contrast, this article looks at actors and policy instruments 
involved in constructing dominant discourses as influenced by their interests. 
4. Methodology 
Fieldwork was conducted between September 2016 and January 2017 with 
follow-up interviews in 2019. The targeted period of study is significant because 
Zimbabwe’s National Energy Policy was promulgated in 2012 and it is intriguing 
to trace how discourse has been influencing policy and other interventions.    
Being a study driven by a discursive approach, it was ideal to employ qualitative 
methods that are integral to discourse analysis, the design of the study, following 
Adger et al.’s approach [39]. To solicit the key discourses, I conducted semi-
structured interviews, using standard questions complemented by open 
conversational prompts.  
Discourses do not merely float in the world but are tied to specific actors and 
organisations, therefore, becoming institutionalised into practices and ways of 
reasoning [22]. More often than not, it is the discourse of the elite that influences 
policy and not of the powerless poor [40]. Therefore, the energy poor were not 
interviewed which is a limitation of this article- their views were not included.  
Accordingly, key participants included four respondents from the Zimbabwe 
Electricity Transmission and Distribution Company (ZETDC), five from the 
Rural Electrification Agency (REA) and the MEPD. The interviewees also 
included representations from three leading international non-governmental 
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organisations dealing with energy issues in Zimbabwe and two from local 
organisations. In an effort to triangulate data, following Bowen [41], 
documentary analysis such as policies, newspapers and strategy reports was 
conducted. Purposive sampling was used for both methods of data gathering. 
Two approaches to data analysis were adopted. In the first approach, Hsieh and 
Shannon’s [42] conventional content analysis directed the coding of 14 
interviews and 23 documents. I coded cognitively, working with the transcripts 
using coloured pens to select texts, which suggested seminal discourses, in the 
data, and appending codes to the meanings of the field data [42]. Key words, and 
phrases, in context provided similar, dissimilar, inter-linked and frequently 
shared grounded data.  Groundedness in the data provided the analytical base for 
the second method, namely discourse analysis. 
Discourse analysis was used to focus attention on how specific narratives of 
energy poverty were framed. Following Adger et al. three foci of discourse 
analysis were pursued: analysis of regularities in expressions to identify 
discourses, analysis of actors producing, reproducing and transforming 
discourses and analysis of the social impacts and policy outcomes of discourses 
[39]. In Section 5, I attempt to address all three factors, with particular focus on 
the relationship between discourse, policy formulation and practice. At a 
summative level, I provide an exemplar of analysed data in Appendix 1 to show 
the inter-relationships of coding, theming and discourse generation [43]. The 
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exemplar is the outcome of several cycles of coding, and supports the field data 
to embody the claim that energy poverty was largely perceived as an outcome of 
external factors.  
5. Findings and discussion 
 5.1 Climate change as a dominant narrative 
 Climate change emerges as a dominant discourse, first because of its frequency 
of visibility in policy documents, media and interviews. Additionally, it is based 
on how such a narrative is put to use as part of the play of power. 
         Extract 1 
On his return from New York, where he addressed the United Nations General Assembly, 
Mugabe told his supporters … that Energy and Power Development Minister Samuel Undenge 
should not be blamed for the 18-hour power cuts Zimbabweans have to endure every day. He 
said Undenge was not a ‘generator,’ before blaming drought for low water levels at Kariba 
Dam- the main source of electricity for Zimbabwe. Mugabe’s feeble and rather arrogant excuse 
for the power cuts coincided with reports that former Zambian Acting President Guy Scott had 
blamed his country for the depletion of Kariba Dam water levels. Scott’s statements contradict 
Mugabe’s assertion that drought is to blame for the crisis. As we report today, Zimbabwe and 
Zambia ignored advice from the Zambezi River Authority … to use the Kariba Dam water 
sparingly. According to Scott, poor oversight saw the two countries driving water levels down 
to 29% of capacity … from 70% last year [44]. 
Drawing upon the text, we can venture two possible explanations regarding the 
government’s roles: episteme and techne. The episteme of government concerns 
itself with what forms of thought, knowledge, expertise and calculation are 
employed in governing and how form is given to what is governable [45: p.20-
27]. In what follows, the article analyses how the text evinces this concept before 
it teases out the techne one.  
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First, discourse cannot be separated from those engaged in it [35]. For Mugabe 
(former president of Zimbabwe), electricity shortage is a natural phenomenon, 
which is inevitable due to changes in the climate while Scott’s (former deputy 
president of Zambia) views suggest that electricity shortage has anthropogenic 
causes. The former’s discourse absolves the government of any wrongdoing, 
placing blame on factors such as drought. Climate change is a global challenge 
and his stance shifts blame to the industrialised world for their ecological debt. 
Evidently, this narrative externalises the causes of energy poverty as outcomes of 
nature and the profligacy of the global North.  
This has implications for energy policy. A failure to provide for the energy poor 
becomes nature’s fault and not humanity’s. Former permanent secretary in the 
MEPD observes: ‘There is nothing dramatic you can do in response. In other 
words, you can’t find a quick solution to reduced generation from Kariba or any 
other station’ [46]. Corroborating this view was an international NGO practitioner 
who when asked about the causes of energy poverty in Zimbabwe, said: ‘Climate 
change is real. There is no water at Kariba… [sic].’ Furthermore, given the 
powerful positionality of MEPD representatives, for instance, in the person of a 
permanent secretary, such statements have influence on the media. Resultantly, 
the media reproduces the government position, for example, the New 
Zimbabwe.com carries a headline: ‘Power shortage looms as Kariba Dam dries 
up due to drought’ [47]. This shared view by the ministry, NGO and the media 
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evinces the formation of a discourse coalition. This means a group is created of 
actors who share a similar social construct or interpretation and the policies 
needed to address the issue [22]. Here, the coalition subscribes to the net deficit 
supply discourse due to decreasing water resources. This narrative constructs 
winners and losers. For politicians, it is convenient, because a lack of energy 
access does not point to inadequacies of the country’s energy policy nor its 
political economy.  
Here the loser is the energy policy. When changes in the climate are considered 
the problem, it follows that there are solutions to be proffered. In this context, 
while in the earlier instance, a water shortage at Kariba was the problem; 
suspiciously, in 2017, then President of Zimbabwe commended the efforts of 
adding two units to the Kariba South extension project [48], which was later 
commissioned in March 2018 [49]. Here is the irony. If in the earlier instance 
concerns existed regarding drought affecting the Kariba Dam, what then is the 
guarantee that the Kariba South extension will not also be hit by drought? 
Similarly, local newspapers report on how the construction of new dams is 
praised by politicians in increasing electricity generation capacity [50]. This 
blowing of hot and cold is inimical to policy consistency. It seems that the 
narrative about drought is used as a device through which specific ideas of blame 
and responsibility are attributed [51].  
16 
 
Furthermore, here we see how science can be used as a tool to legitimise social 
problems. Climate change is a scientific phenomenon; it is therefore beyond 
question and should be taken as the universal truth.  Hence, the exoneration of 
then Zimbabwean energy minister, that: ‘he is not an electricity ‘generator.’’ The 
use of this metaphor, seduces us into believing that there is nothing wrong with 
the social order; electricity shortage is explained as a natural phenomenon. As 
such, the narrative of drought affecting hydro water sources becomes dominant. 
This happens when the media overplays this science informed narrative to 
legitimise climate change. For example, a newspaper headline: ‘Zimbabwe power 
cuts may deepen as water levels fall at Kariba Dam’ is persuasive [52].  
Although views of the energy poor are not included here, the influence of media 
cannot be trivialised; people believe what they read and thus climate change 
becomes the villain. This dominance of discourse has implications for policy both 
on the supply and demand sides of electricity. This happens when it facilitates the 
opening of certain solutions rather than others. Consequently, it is apt to analyse 
the techne of government; ‘to understand through what means, mechanisms, 
tactics and technologies is authority constituted and rule accomplished’ [45: p.20-
27].  
5.1.1 Discourse and the supply side of energy 
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On the supply side, an example is here instructive.  As the dominant discourse of 
electricity shortage prevailed, electricity deficit became the problem to be 
addressed, rather than a symptom of flawed energy policy. Text analysis reveals 
that the narrative of a shortage of electricity facilitated the implementation of 
flawed interventions. For example, an emergency Dema Diesel Power Plant 
(hereafter the Dema Project) was set up to curb the power shortage between 2016 
up to past mid-2017 [53]. However, it was unsuccessful. First, the interview with 
key informant 2 from the ZETDC revealed that electricity generated from the 
Dema Project cost 15.45c/kWh, while procurement cost at Kariba was 1.76c/kWh 
and Hwange procurement cost 8.87c/kWh (as at October 2016). These figures 
reveal that this ‘emergency’ intervention was not in the best interest of the power 
utility (ZESA); the procurement cost was unsustainable. This emergency plant 
used 230 diesel generators instead of liquid petroleum gas (which is cheaper), and 
that in part explains the high price [54].  
Second, the use of diesel contributes to pollution in its entirety. This supports 
Dalu et al.’s observation that the operation of the Dema Project resulted in ‘social 
trap’ [54: p.125]. This is a situation whereby it is difficult for the affected to 
escape exposure to pollution either because of socio-economic reasons or because 
it is not identified as a problem by the affected-a sign of a lack of education [54]. 
Here, the winners are project developers and the losers are the power utility 
(procuring expensive electricity), affected communities and their livelihoods, and 
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the polluted surrounding environment. This is exactly how dominant discourse 
works when it sediments into institutions and their practices. The focus is on 
curbing a power shortage which has been caused by changes in the climate and 
the emergency diesel power plant was the flawed solution.  
5.1.2 Discourse and demand side of energy 
On the demand side, it emerged that dominant discourse can cascade to the 
institutions where demand management strategies are crafted. Because the 
problem has been identified as a shortage of electricity caused by natural factors, 
it logically follows that the demand must be managed. This epitomises discourse 
‘structuration’ [22:p.46]. This happens when a discourse dominates the way a 
power utility conceptualises energy poverty. This powerful discourse 
structuration serves as a basis for management interventions.  
In 2012, the power utility drove public awareness on the use of energy saving 
bulbs. There are two major rationales for this. First, energy savers last 10 times 
longer than incandescent bulbs, they use 80 percent less electricity [55]. 
Therefore, they should reduce load shedding. A senior ZESA engineer was 
quoted: ‘When the 5, 5 million energy saver bulbs are installed, up to 200 
megawatts would be saved daily’ [56]. Likewise, in 2012, Zimbabwe introduced 
the electricity prepaid metring system with the anticipation of improving 
efficiency in electricity use and ZESA’s revenue flows [57]  because  it ‘forces’ 
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consumers to monitor their consumption behaviour [58]. Similarly, in 2019, 
Electricity (solar water heating) Act was passed, (Statutory Instrument 235 of 
2019). Its objective is: ‘… to regulate the installation, licensing, operation, repair, 
maintenance, retrofit and upgrade of solar water heating systems for the 
production of sanitary hot water to save electricity’ [59: p.1479, my emphasis).  
These regulations do not allow the connection of electric geysers to new premises, 
only existing premises are exempted [59]. The view against electric geysers is 
that: ‘energy experts have noted that heating water in geysers absorbs 40 percent 
of electricity used by an average home and that Zimbabwe has over 250 000 
electric geysers’ [60]. Consequently, should the solar geysers be embraced, the 
country will save about 300MW a year [60].   
The foregoing discussion is predicated on two presumed solutions- saving and 
efficiency. In the government’s view, a lack of saving and inefficient use of 
electricity is the problem. Government policies are sold as merely technical 
solutions to an agreed problem. What is rarely acknowledged is that technological 
fixes are more appealing than any other because ‘they require that people do 
basically nothing’ [61: p.3]. This approach makes it possible to remove all 
problems from the political realm and to recast them in a natural way.  
Consider the following: Asked how the energy saving bulbs and energy efficient 
geysers have eased the situation, a ZETDC official explained, ‘It has significantly 
done so, because we transfer the power to where it would be needed most, for 
20 
 
example, the industry.’  This needs to be unpacked. Extending power to where 
the grid is already concentrated (urban areas) does not change the status of those 
in rural areas without grid access. Rather, uneven distribution of resources 
intensifies the problems of uneven development [62]. Similarly, the use of 
prepaid metres as efficient tools of supply and demand management is 
questionable because they are instruments of neoliberalism [58]. Neoliberal 
tendencies put profit first before social welfare. These revelations show that a 
discourse focused on facilitating efficiency alone, does not serve the ordinary 
citizens. Rather, it gives more power to the government to control people in the 
name of efficiency, while avoiding issues such as energy equality, justice and 
social equity.  
5.2 Vandalism of electricity infrastructure as a dominant narrative 
Vandalism of the electricity infrastructure also emerges as a dominant narrative 
that expresses the dominant discourse of net deficit. The powerful actors mainly 
advance this discourse and resultantly, the media endorse it. For instance, a 
newspaper headline: ‘ZETDC fights infrastructure vandalism’ [63] is instructive. 
The Chronicle [64] reports that:  
President Mnangagwa … said ZESA workers had a hand in the rampant 
vandalism and theft of electricity infrastructure …  
 
Likewise, senior executives at ZESA decry the loss that the utility suffers, hence 
compromising its capacity to deliver services. Estimates are that the power utility 
needs at least US$40 million to replace more than 4000 transformers, which have 
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been vandalised across the country and it has lost up to 1000km of power lines 
[64]. Asked how vandalism and illegal connections have contributed to electricity 
shortages, a REA executive said:  
Criminals are always there and they are so determined to sabotage 
development programmes that they leave no stone unturned.  
 
This line of thought contends that, but for vandalism and illegal connections, the 
utility would be able to deliver the electricity services as expected. For that 
reason, policy options that are adopted include first, the replacement of the 
vandalised infrastructure, because a deficit has emerged. Second, technological 
fixes are proposed. This includes exploring avenues of using devices such as 
drones to monitor the infrastructure [64]. The MEPD deputy minister observed: 
‘ZETDC resolved to install intruder detection systems on approximately 27 000 
distribution transformers nationwide, at an approximate cost of US$13, 5 million’ 
[65]. Third, punishment of a 10 year mandatory, custodial sentence is considered 
as a solution to curb the malaise. 
The aforementioned measures fall short of a deeper analysis. Asked the reason 
why there is high rate of vandalism and illegal connections, key informant 2 from 
the ZETDC said:  
This is caused by economic hardships. If I have the money, why would I 
want to go the illegal route? I would just pay and get my electricity freely. 
Therefore, it is not out of perversity, but out of necessity. There is a lot 
unemployment…  
 
 Similarly, key informant 3 from the ZETDC elaborated: 
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People here are poor....Not that they just want to commit crimes, but they 
are doing it out of necessity.  
 
Observations by the utility employees illuminate policy inadequacies, which are 
seldom analysed in relation to energy access. It is clear that unemployment, 
inequality, poverty and crime defy any simple dissection. Therefore, we are 
confronted with ‘crimes of poverty’ [66: p.373]. A senior official in the MEPD 
explained:  
If the situation were normal, we would say that the better off could cross- 
subside the poor, but it is not normal.  It is difficult for everyone, the 
better off are also struggling. 
 
The ‘crime of poverty’ does not float in the vacuum, but manifests in the existing 
political economy. For this reason, energy access cannot be dealt with 
independent of the political economy.  It could be that the fraction of society that 
vandalises the infrastructure is not able to buy electricity because of inability or 
unwillingness of an economic system to create enough jobs (or to pay enough to 
those who do work).  The narrative of vandalism and illegal connections masks 
reality- all is portrayed as natural and outright criminality- and externalises the 
blame (absolving the government and the service providers). This view is myopic 
because it maintains the status quo. A senior ZETDC executive was quoted as 
saying: ‘Vandalism could be addressed if citizens ‘change their culture’’ [63].  
For him, the problem is with the ‘vandals.’ What is made invisible by this 
understanding of energy poverty is that probably it is the state, which should 
change its behaviour and own up to its contractual obligation of delivering service 
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to its citizens. Even if transformers were to be replaced and supply of electricity 
increased, those without access will be forced to continue committing crimes of 
poverty.  Hence, a publication recently reported: ‘High electricity charges trigger 
illegal connections in Zimbabwe’ [67].  
5.3 Sanctions as a sanctioned discourse 
Zimbabwe has been under Western sanctions since the early 2000s, targeted at 
the political elite, who stand accused of the controversial land reform programme 
and are held accountable for economic decline and human rights violations, 
among other constitutional concerns [68].  Resultantly, these sanctions have been 
blamed for hampering economic development, including in the energy sector. 
          Extract 2 
The energy infrastructure dilapidated significantly since the imposition of sanctions due to 
decreased Foreign Direct Investments. There has been limited access to credit lines and 
financial support from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which stopped 
their support for energy infrastructure development programmes. International investors 
demand government guarantees as prerequisite for investing in the sector, while charging high 
interest rates on loans for infrastructure development. This has impacted negatively on the rate 
of implementation of capital projects, resulting in curtailed and unreliable power infrastructure, 
insecure power supply and uncompetitive industries, with power outages directly affecting 
other sectors such as agriculture … [69]. 
This excerpt reveals that energy poverty is understood as a problem lying within 
the frosty relations between Harare and the West. This involves a lack of support 
for energy infrastructure development programmes, curtailed and unreliable 
power infrastructure, insecure power supply and power outages. This school of 
thought posits that, had the situation been reversed, with good relations with the 
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international community, energy poverty could be curbed. Therefore, the energy 
sector is a victim of sanctions. 
However, this view is not held by all in government. Asked how sanctions have 
contributed to energy poverty in Zimbabwe, key informant 3 from the power 
utility said:  
Sometimes we need excuses where they are not even relevant; there was 
no investment in the sector when the country was still creditworthy, well 
before these sanctions came about!  
Key informant 1 concurred with key informant 3 and explained:  
 While this narrative has been widely quoted by some sections, issues like 
energy poverty are explained differently because people have different 
opinions, and sometimes we end up going with the flow though with some 
deep reservations.   
Although discourse about sanctions explains energy poverty from a government’s 
perspective, it is not a dominant opinion. Nonetheless, due to skewed power 
relations, it gains currency. That does not, however, make it a dominant 
discourse; rather it emerges as a sanctioned discourse [40]. Simply put, a 
sanctioned discourse is not always dominant, but is legitimised. In this case, the 
‘sanctioning’ actor is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The 
powerful elite make their discourse ‘heard’ and have impact beyond their own 
political domain, while the weaker discourses are not ‘heard’ by as wide or as 
influential an audience. Put differently, each sector has ‘its general politics of 
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truth: that is, the types of discourse that it accepts and makes function as true’ 
[8:p.131].  
Drawing on the sanctioned discourse about sanctions as the source of energy 
poverty in Zimbabwe, it appears Chinese energy investment has become the 
alternative. This is evidenced by how the Zimbabwean Government has 
contracted Chinese Companies to boost the generation capacity. For instance, the 
Sinohydro was contracted to expand the Hwange Thermal Power Station’s units 
7 and 8 [70] and China Africa Sunlight Energy is set to build a 300MW power 
station at Gwayi in Northern Zimbabwe [71]. This supports the view that China 
is now the single largest source of external finance for power-generation 
investments in sub-Saharan Africa [72]. However, depending on a country with 
a fast-growing economy such as China has its downside.  
It is critical to appreciate that fast economic growth survives through the 
production of space [73] or what Harvey calls “spatial-temporal fix” [74: p.87]. 
It is a metaphor for a particular kind of solution to capitalist crises through 
temporal deferral and geographical expansion. This involves a chronic tendency 
within neoliberalism where surplus of capital is available without there being any 
means to bring these mechanisms together profitably to accomplish socially 
useful tasks [74]. Chinese solar PV cell and module makers quickly dominated 
global sales in renewable energy technology, while the country’s wind turbine 
producers become poised for significant exports after capturing their rapidly 
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growing home market [75]. It is clear that if devaluation is to be avoided, then 
profitable ways must be found to absorb the capital surpluses; geographical 
expansion and spatial reorganisation provide options in that regard. Hence, we 
witness China’s significant entrance into sub-Saharan Africa’s energy sector, and 
in Zimbabwe in particular, especially through public-private partnerships.  The 
national energy policy states that:  
…private sector will be the engine of economic recovery and growth in 
Zimbabwe… [1:p.viii-iv]. 
 
That being so, where the interests of the private sector are put at the heart of 
infrastructure planning, public-private partnerships are likely to replicate the 
inequalities of early deployments of electricity that served the wealthy and 
ignored the economically weak [76]. With this as a basis, it is clear that while 
international relations are pivotal in promoting investment, we should not lose 
sight of the power of heterogeneous interests among actors.  
5.4 Renewable energy as an institutional discourse 
Zimbabwe hopes that renewable energy will help to address energy problems.  
This is because the country has huge and diverse renewable energy potential, 
which needs to be harnessed effectively to create a sustainable energy portfolio. 
Thus, specific renewable energy targets are provided in the policy. By 2025, the 
policy targets 16.5% of the total generating capacity or 1 100MW from renewable 
sources and this goes up to 26.5% or 2 100MW by 2030 [19:p.07]. 
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Empirical evidence reveals that renewable energy could do for electricity what 
the mobile phone did for telecommunication: leapfrog and provide millions of 
households with access to a technology that creates new opportunities. NGO 
respondents unanimously shared this belief. Asked what the source of energy 
poverty in Zimbabwe is, NGO 2 said: ‘a low adoption of renewable energy in the 
energy mix’ and NGO 4 explained: ‘people need to be educated about renewable 
energy-it is life changing...’ Responding to the same question, NGO 3 elaborated:  
 We need renewable energy in this country, and once the renewable energy 
policy is in place, we are good to go. NGOs and government are working 
together on this policy…   
Here the NGOs’ discourse is premised on ‘appropriate technology’ in the form of 
renewable energy, which places emphasis on moving away from reliance upon 
non-renewable energy sources towards an increased use of renewable resources.   
Borrowing from the phrase ‘technological determinism’ [77], here we witness 
what I call ‘renewable energy determinism’- this is when renewable energy 
technologies are perceived as a game–changer in the socio-economic life of the 
end users. Arguably, renewable energy technology has become an institutional 
discourse-conceptualised by the government (MEPD, in particular) and the 
NGOs as the solution to energy poverty as solidified by the National Renewable 
Energy Policy, which was promulgated in March 2019. A discourse becomes 
institutionalised ‘when many people use it to conceptualise the world’ [22:p.46]. 
Put simply, this happens when it solidifies into an institution, sometimes as 
organisational practices, and sometimes as ways of reasoning.  
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The primary objective of the policy is setting of overall targets for renewable 
energy based on the Nationally Determined Contributors interventions submitted 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, demand-
supply scenario, grid absorption capacity, and the ability of utilities to pay for 
renewable energy electricity [19 : p.07]. This discourse peddles the fallacy that 
clean and abundant energy is the panacea for energy poverty. What is little 
understood is that ‘disseminating a technology would work if, somehow, the 
technology did more for the poor, undereducated, and powerless than it did for 
the rich, well-educated, and mighty’ [78: p.16). Sadly, the greater one’s capacity, 
the more technology delivers; the lesser one’s capacity, the less value technology 
has. It would be insightful if policy makers could start by querying whether the 
abundant availability of renewable energy in the energy mix would solve other 
problems in the energy sector. For instance, does a bigger percentage of 
renewable energy in the energy mix imply a lower tariff rate or does it guarantee 
democratic energy futures?  
While wind and sunshine are freely available, the benefits are not equally shared, 
because the supporting technologies and infrastructure are not [79]. This is 
seldom analysed because the received wisdom holds that Zimbabwe needs 
renewable energy for a more appropriate energy mix. However, renewable energy 
deployment is a limited solution. In fact, if it is not properly implemented it can 
present more problems, especially to the power utility. For instance, due to tax 
incentives awarded to renewable energy projects [19: p.24], there is a danger of 
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attracting illegitimate and corrupt investors. This creates the Matthew effect [80], 
whereby the advantaged accumulate further benefits, while in this case, energy 
poverty tends to produce further poverty for the ordinary citizens. 
Fetishising renewable energy, without highlighting its downside has a likelihood 
of leading to inaccurate beliefs about what renewable energy could do to alleviate 
energy poverty. For example, NGO 5 explained that:  
Most local investors are sceptical about renewable energy because they 
know that people who are going to benefit from it are in rural areas, 
unfortunately, they do not have financial security. 
 
The adoption of renewable energy is dependent upon social, political-economic, 
geographic and cultural contexts. Understood as such, discourse which vaunts the 
adoption of renewable energy as an answer to energy poverty is inadequate. This 
is especially true given the ambivalences that emerged. NGO 4 observed:  
Renewable energy has become a people driven energy policy-it is people 
themselves who have noticed how good renewable energy is and they 
started adopting it…  
 
In a similar vein, NGO 1 concurred with NGO 4 and explained:  
People are taking issues to do with renewable energy into their own hands. 
It is because they no longer have confidence in authorities who are 
supposed to provide services. They are responding to a crisis of power 
cuts… 
 
In a similar line of thought, key informant 4 weighed in: 
 
I am ZESA, I am electricity and I cannot promote my competitor [sic]. To 
a certain extent, renewables are our competitors… If not careful, they will 
take business away from us, unfortunately my bread is buttered at 
electricity [sic] and not solar… 
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These views are insightful.  First, the fact that renewable energy is considered as 
energy poor’s agency in response to the state’s failure is illuminating. This is not 
a matter of choice, but of survival.  Due to a failure to understand this complexity, 
the state intervenes to increase decentralised small renewable energy 
technologies: ‘Even if you are living in a grass-thatched hut …you can have a 
solar lantern,’ said a participant from the REA. This approach allows the state to 
overlook what it is failing to do, which results in power cuts. Put simply, this 
‘renewable energy determinism’ trumps political action as a source of desired 
social change [81]. Without addressing the broader political economy, adding 
renewable energy into the energy mix will not address the socio-political system 
at the heart of the problem [82].  
 Second, the sentiments by the utility employee evince conflicting interests.     
This participant does not understand renewable energy in the context of what it 
successfully achieves, but in how it can hinder his financial gains as a ZESA 
employee.   
5.5. Counter narrative:  the other discourse 
 The preceding sections presented evidence on how discourse by the elite 
absolves the local political-economic system for causing energy poverty by 
apportioning blame on external. What are the political implications of the 
proffered excuses? More often than not, what results is the ‘technification’ of 
energy poverty. This allows experts to remove problems from the political realm 
and to recast them in the more neutral realm of science [83]. The objective for 
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conducting this discourse analysis is not simply to critique, but to create ‘counter-
narratives’ that tell a truer story.  
Empirical evidence, largely advanced by the power utility employees, reveals that 
governance of the power utility is at the heart of energy crisis. Responding to the 
view regarding the ‘dry’ Kariba as the major contributing factor to electricity 
shortage, Guy Scott (former Zambian vice president) said:  
What we have now is a weak regulator sitting between two puppies 
drinking milk from the same saucer. If one does not lick fast enough, it will 
not get as much as the other one [84].  
These sentiments invoke the complexities that characterise trans-boundary water 
sharing for hydropower. These powers are competing to over-exploit the resource 
for the betterment of one country and not the other.  For instance, on the Kariba 
North, a 360MW hydropower expansion by Zambia, which increased the 
generation capacity by 50%, worsened the situation [44]. Recently, Zimbabwe 
completed the Kariba South Power Extension Project, which adds 300MW to the 
national grid. It is not clear whether this development will not have the same 
effect that the Zambia’s Kariba North Extension had on the Kariba Dam.  
However, what is clear here is that discourse about drought as the sole cause of 
decreased water capacity is rejected. The other discourse emerging here is that 
politicians tend to overlook the role played by both governments (Zimbabwe and 
Zambia) in creating electricity shortage. 
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In addition, the sentiments expressed metaphorically have governance and 
regulatory undertones. The metaphor artfully reveals the gaps between policy and 
practice, especially given that the Kariba Dam is regulated by the Zambezi River 
Authority. In many circumstances its warnings are ignored by the parties involved 
for economic expediency. According to Scott, failure to heed the Zambezi River 
Authority’s warning of using water sparingly triggered the low water levels [44].  
 From interviews with the power utility officials, the dominant theme that 
emerged is: ‘you mess up ZESA, you mess up Zimbabwe.’ In other words, the 
focus is centred upon the power utility as opposed to the external factors. Asked 
how he understands and interprets energy poverty in Zimbabwe, key informant 3 
explained:  
The power utility is the cornerstone of electricity issues in their entirety 
and therefore should be governed with great caution.  However, that is not 
happening. We are a government owned entity, and that mentality of saying 
this entity is ‘ours’ is killing ZESA. Too many times the elite do not pay 
their dues. 
These observations evoke issues concerning the governance of state-owned 
parastatals post-independence. Contrary to the belief that parastatals were created 
to ensure the delivery of affordable essential services, the evidence shows that 
power utilities have become centres of political patronage, corruption and rent-
seeking. Concurring with key informant 3, it emerged that:  
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Cabinet ministers, senior civil servants and Members of Parliament are 
bleeding ZESA by refusing to pay electricity bills at their private 
properties and using political muscle to avoid being switched off [85]. 
In a similar vein, key informant 2 lamented the devastating effect of the Dema 
Project of 2016-2017:  
Dema Power Project was a corrupt deal. Nepotism was laid bare in that 
deal because ZANU-PF loyalists, friends and families executed it...  
This finding supports Mbohwa’s earlier observation that political decisions have 
dominated the management of the power utility in a negative way [86]. 
In the same line of reasoning, all key informants who were interviewed from the 
parastatal understood and interpreted energy poverty as an outcome of a lack of 
investment in the sector post-independence.  Key informant 2 captured it vividly: 
Well, as you might know, since independence we did not invest in 
electricity generation. Just after independence, there was completion of 
Hwange which started late 1970s and expansion of Hwange in 1987-1988. 
Stage 2 units were commissioned, from there, there wasn’t any investment 
in electricity generation and yet the demand was growing… 
Here external forces are rejected as the source of energy poverty. Rather, energy 
poverty should be understood as a man-made phenomenon. This discourse places 
blame on the government for not adequately investing in electricity generation 
and therefore, according to this view a scenario of demand outstripping supply is 
inevitable. These sentiments are instructive in that they contradict the views of 
the same government.  In this regard, Neils Bohr’s famous remark is illustrative: 
‘deep truth is one whose opposite is also true.’ Therefore, if we believe what the 
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dominant discourse espouses, it is time we believed what the other discourse says 
about energy poverty in Zimbabwe.  
6. Conclusions and policy implications  
The article analysed competing discourses regarding the causes of energy poverty 
in Zimbabwe, and opened up a debate as to how we might best interpret, 
understand and recast our present situation. It analysed the narratives that 
constitute these discourses showing their shortcomings to provide an alternative 
explanation for energy poverty and the solutions that are open to address this 
phenomenon. The main discourse of net deficit (supply-demand mismatch), 
interprets energy poverty as an outcome of external factors. This is made possible 
by the asymmetrical power relations among actors. This discourse dominates 
policy, power utility and energy provision in general.  
It emerged that discourse is not static. Rather, there are alternative views, here 
termed the other discourse. Contrary to the dominant discourse of net deficit, 
which externalises the causes of energy poverty, the other discourse maintains 
that energy poverty is man-made (due to political patronage, corruption and rent-
seeking). For proponents of this view, power utility governance should be the 
cornerstone of energy policy and practice.  
 Taking these findings as a whole, the paper arrived at two conclusions. First, 
energy poverty cannot be understood outside of the political-economic discourse 
that constructs and interprets it. This implies that epistemological concerns about 
energy poverty should be our starting point before we deal with the materiality of 
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energy poverty. Second, discourse concerning energy poverty is ‘power over’ 
ordinary citizens as they become subjects to it (as required by the solutions 
espoused by the prevailing discourses). Also, its ‘power over’ effect is 
experienced when it allows certain issues to be discussed and not others; certain 
solutions to be adopted and not others.  
That being so, the way forward lies with the energy policy planners conducting 
an in-depth discursive analysis of energy poverty to correct a too narrow policy 
agenda. Heeding a call by Taylor as cited by Pepper, perhaps policy makers need 
to open their eyes to an aspect of reality that does not fit comfortably into their 
present belief structure - the other discourse [87].  Should they at least consider 
it, Taylor advises to hang on to it, expand on it and explore it and not to suppress 
or deny it. Only in the resulting light, can we challenge the dominant discourses 
that blame external factors only, without paying particular attention to power 
utility governance – the other discourse. 
The article focused on an individual case study, but an endeavour to establish 
how these perceptions can differ between countries is worthwhile. Therefore, a 
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